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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
As economic reforms are mutually interdependent, a liberal policy package needs internal 
coherence. How can a coherent reform strategy be achieved for a well-balanced and functional 
economic system? The theory of second-best originated in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) suggests 
that in the presence of a large number of distortions, a piecemeal reform approach is unlikely to 
produce a good strategy and actually may reduce welfare. Yet, a radial reform strategy achieving 
proportional reductions in all distortions at the same time can be shown to be unambiguously 
welfare improving. This result is due to Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) and was generalised by 
Rader (1976) and Bergstrom (1996).  
The difficulty and time needed to build institutions often leads to adopt a compromise: some 
short-term deadweight losses are accepted to reap the long-term benefits of reforms. A piecemeal 
approach to reform has been also justified on the grounds of political constraints as political 
cycles are often too short to engage several reform fronts at the same time.  
The idea of engaging several reforms in parallel may also reflect policy complementarities. This 
goes back to Edgeworth (“doing more in one thing increases the returns to doing more of 
another”) but it has been generalised in such a way that it does not require any particular 
differentiability or convexity assumptions (Topkis, 1998). This framework has been applied 
notably to industrial organisation and institutional analysis (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; 
Amable, 2003). Rather than focusing on the constraint of removing all distortions at the same 
time or in equal proportions, the existence of complementarity signals a benefit instead, i.e. the 
return of doing one reform is enhanced when other reforms are in place.  
Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been paid to complementarity in the vast literature 
relating the design and the scope of reforms to overall economic performance. To be sure, cross-
section or panel regressions of composite reform indicators on growth have provided mixed or 
inconclusive evidence. The link between liberal reforms and growth was been questioned by 
Rodrik (2003), who points out that there is not a unique mapping from institutional function to 
form and therefore that liberal economic reforms are not the only path to achieving the goal of 
creating a full-fledged market economy capable of sustaining growth. Such reforms are more 
likely to fall prey to the second-best argument when there is a tendency for ready-made policy 
packages (e.g. Washington-consensus type) and much less is known about local conditions. 
Independently of whether results are favourable to the presumption that reforms improve 
economy’s prospects, Rodrik (2005) criticises regressions of composite reform indicators on the 
rate of GDP growth. He stresses that we know much more about sustaining growth in high-
income countries, but much less about igniting growth in poor countries. For the latter, non-
orthodox policies could be appropriate to trigger a growth process. Growth, in turn, would help 
sustaining reform.  
This has two important consequences. First, Rodrik’s analysis suggests that rather than a broad-
based reform, the lesson is to concentrate on the key barrier(s) to growth, rather than trying to 
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undertake all reforms (or removing all distortions) at once. Second, policies are typically 
endogenous to the growth process. In many countries, the sequence was rather first high growth, 
then better institutions rather than the reverse. In this context, usual regressions of economic 
growth on policies may not give many insights on how economic development unfolds (Rodrik, 
2005).  
Against this background, this paper proposes a framework aiming at somewhat reconciling the 
core result of second-best theory, according to which a liberal reform package has to be 
comprehensive by nature, with the fact that igniting a reform process may require focusing on 
the main distortions blocking the take-off of the economy. To this aim, we define a 
complementarity index across structural reforms and investigate its impact on economic growth.  
We used a set of structural reform indicators compiled by the EBRD for Central and Eastern 
European countries in transition. While broadly qualitative, these indicators provide a 
sufficiently comprehensive and consistent evaluation by the EBRD experts of the structural 
transformation transition process. Taking the transition process as a policy experiment is 
particularly attractive. Allowing for different initial conditions, at the outset, all transition 
countries were offered roughly the same liberal policy package designed to make use of market 
mechanisms to obtain the best possible allocation of resources. Countries have implemented this 
package in different ways and extent leading to a wide and rich variation of outcomes. Starting 
in the early 1990s up to the integration of in the EU of new Member countries, this period also 
corresponds to a nearly complete policy cycle.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next two sections briefly discuss the basis for the 
second-best result and the mathematics of complementarity. This is followed by an analysis of 
main reform areas and the interdependence of policies in the context of emerging markets and 
transition countries, using information collected in OECD country surveys, and describes the 
content and some features of the EBRD reform indicators. Section 5 considers composite reform 
indicators, focusing on reform level and complementarity. Using these indicators, we then test 
the impact of the level and changes of reform indicators on output growth by means of an 
econometric panel estimate. The paper ends with a summary and thoughts for further research, 
especially on how to draw the insights from the previous analysis and results to EU reform 
strategy. 
2. Second-best and reform strategy 
The seminal paper by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) proved that starting from a second-best 
situation, the only way to ensure a non-ambiguous increase in welfare is to remove all the 
distortions simultaneously. From this rather pessimistic view on the way to conduct economic 
reforms and their impact on economic reform on welfare, Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) proved 
that, under some conditions, the following result holds in single-equilibrium theory:  
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Theorem (Foster and Sonneschein, 1970): With a flat production function and if no 
commodity is inferior in the production function, then a radial increase in distortion is 
associated with a reduction in utility.  
A radial increase in distortion derives from the comparison between two d-equilibria, each 
characterised by a level of distortions,  D1 and D2, where D2=k.D1 and k>1.  The index k can be 
seen as a proportional shift in all distortions simultaneously compared with the first-best 
situation.  This isomorphic shift is required in order to ensure that the mapping between d-
equilibria and distortion is unique.  
The correspondence between a proportional reduction in distortions and tax reforms is relatively 
easy to understand.  In more general cases, it may be quite difficult to define a set of meaningful 
indicators, having the same dimensionality and range of variation. Nevertheless, the 
development of institutional and reform indicators in recent years has made significant progress 
in this direction.1 
Let us assume that N reform areas have been identified and a set of indicators (R1, R2,…., RN) 
defined in such a way that when considering a proportional move in all reform areas:  
ik
R
R
i
i ∀>=∆ ,0  (1) 
this is equivalent to a radial removal of distortions. Under appropriate conditions, each value of 
the parameter k would then define a single d-equilibrium. In principle, it could be possible to 
construct a composite indicator measuring how far a given reform package is far from a radial 
move. For example, one minus the variance of the different ki would provide an appropriate 
Euclidean metric: 
( )∑ −−=
i
i kkN
RR
2ˆ11  (2) 
where kˆ is the average of the ki.   RR=1 would imply a radial shift in the distortions.  
3. From second-best to Supermodularity and policy complementarity 
Accordingly, a reform strategy ensuring a non-ambiguous increase in welfare would be to 
reduce the distortions progressively in a radial manner. The problem is that such a reform 
package would lead to an overly ambitious policy agenda. It is difficult to imagine that a 
government, especially in less developed countries, has the information set and the institutional 
capacity to implement such a broad strategy. Rodrik(2006) put forward a similar argument by 
pointing out that a policy advice based on broad-based reform is somewhat unfalsifiable in terms 
of its impacts on economic performance (e.g. GDP growth). When the impact of reforms does not 
                                                     
1 For a discussion on composite indicators and their construction methods, see Nardo et al. (2005).   
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materialise as expected, it can always be argued that some policy areas were left out and 
hindered the overall return of reform package “In the end, it is always the advisee who falls 
short, and never the advisor who is proved wrong”. 
Moreover, the conditions to apply the Foster and Sonnenschein’s result are rather restrictive.  A 
flat production rules out any peculiarities in the indifference curves. Together with the 
isomorphic distortion these conditions avoid multiple equilibria.  While the intuition for a ‘radial’ 
reform strategy is strong, in the sense that there is no welfare gains from piecemeal reforms, the 
conditions appear very demanding even in a static framework.  
In view of the empirical application we are seeking, the modern concept of complementarity 
(Topkis, 1987, 1998) provides an alternative and more flexible framework in which to address 
reform interdependence. It does not require any particular differentiability or convexity 
assumptions, and for example it can be applied to discrete or qualitative policy indicators. The 
framework applies to the case where different reforms (or removal of distortions) are pair-wise 
complementary. As argued below, this seems a relatively general property. It is more often the 
case that policies are related to each other in a complementarity way rather than being 
substitutes.  
The basic idea is as follows. Assume a given objective function F(.) depending from two policy 
instruments (x, y).  A given policy can have two states either reform (x) or no-reform ( x ). In this 
context, the two policies are said to be complementarity if:  
),(),(),(),( yxFyxFyxFyxF −≤−  (3) 
This means that return of moving from minimum ( yx, ) to ( yx, ) (or to ( yx, )) is less than the 
move from ( yx, ) (or from ( yx, )) to the maximum ( yx, ). Put differently, even tough F(.) always 
increases, the return from doing reform x (or y) is greater when reform y (or x) is already in place. 
This formalises the fact that having done one reform maximises the return of doing another 
reform. Note that Edgeworth complementarity is a special case where the complementarity can 
be defined in a differential way: 0),(2 ≥∂∂∂ yxyxF . 
This can be generalised to a case of N reforms. If the complementarity relations (3) hold for every 
pair of reforms, F(.) is said to be supermodular. Optimising in such a system can be achieved by 
increasing all reforms in parallel (but not necessarily in the same proportion as in radial 
reductions in distortions). As shown by Milgrom and Roberts (1995) this achieves at least half of 
the potential gains of an unrestricted optimisation (see Annex). 
This powerful result only applies in comparative statics, so the issues of temporal consistency, 
reputation, etc. cannot be addressed in the framework as it stands. However, we can define a 
time interval suitable for a given reform package and define pair-wise complementarities that 
will achieve the predicted increase in welfare. This can be done for various stages in the process 
of economic growth without the recursive link among stages of reform, which has been found by 
the sequencing literature. Under these conditions, a joint implementation of complementary 
reforms would then unambiguously improve welfare, just like a radial reduction in distortions. 
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This optimisation framework has been applied by Milgrom and Roberts (1995); Amable (2003) 
and Amir (2003), while Acemoglu(2005) presents monotone comparative static results on 
equilibrium technology bias.  
What reforms should be included in a reform package depends on the complementarity relations 
existing for a specific country and a given point in time. For example, as it will be discussed 
below a price liberalisation policy entails a strong complementarity with macroeconomic 
stabilisation and vice-versa. There may also be gains in jointly implementing labour and product 
market reforms even though the greater rigidity of the former has led some authors (Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2002) to suggest that the link may be recursive rather than supermodular. The 
policy implication is that complementarity is an empirical issue, but there is more room for 
reform packages embodying complementarity relations than has generally been thought. 
Effective reform packages do pertain to a particular stage in the growth process and should be 
adjusted by constantly broadening the complementarity across policies as growth moves from 
the neo-classical to Neo-Schumpeterian regimes of Aghion and Howitt(2005). Below we focus on 
the transition process.  
4. Empirical application: the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe  
A decade of transition provides a particular insightful case to explore the linkages across 
different economic reforms. At the outset, all transition countries started from a highly distorted 
system and were offered roughly the same liberal policy package designed to make use of 
market mechanisms to obtain the best possible allocation of resources, which in turn creates the 
conditions for sustainable growth and an improvement of living standards. Of course initial 
conditions differed greatly and this was pointed out at the time. In retrospect, what was perhaps 
overlooked was that such a package would need to be implemented in an internally coherent 
way.  
Indeed, when policies are mutually interdependent, in order to reap the full benefits from 
reform, different policies must, as far as possible, be implemented in parallel. Also because 
reforms are interdependent, a direction of causality is not easy to disentangle. Actually, in first 
place, most transition countries liberalised trade and a large basket of prices, typically excluding 
prices of energy, housing and transport. As a result, the true pattern of demand is revealed as 
relative prices adjust. This was followed by stabilisation, but if the right macroeconomic policy 
mix is not in place, notably when a budget deficit is financed through monetary creation, price 
liberalisation is quickly followed by high and accelerating inflation. In turn, macroeconomic 
stabilisation can only be sustained and lead to economic recovery if significant and steady 
progress is achieved in the area of structural reform. For example, efforts to achieve and maintain 
budget discipline were undermined where enterprises faced weak budget constraints and drew 
resources from the public sector (OECD, 1998, 2002). The channel for this was often not direct 
subsidy from the budget, but instead over-easy access to credit from the banking system, often 
itself in full or partial state ownership. Another example of indirect support is where the state 
maintained an artificially overvalued exchange rate in order to facilitate imports of raw materials 
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or energy to un-restructured heavy industries. This situation persists until firms that fail to add 
value are forced out of the market. During transition, privatisation and restructuring were all 
used to encourage this outcome. But often this process was held back by insufficient use of 
liquidation, the result of ineffective bankruptcy procedures and weak creditor rights. 
Lack of progress in one area affects other structural reforms. For example, large enterprise 
restructuring is undermined in the absence of financial discipline, typically imposed by the 
banking sector. Either banks do not lend, regardless of companies’ creditworthiness, to prevent a 
new accumulation of bad debts, thus reinforcing existing credit constraints. Or else, under 
pressure to resume the flow of lending to un-restructured enterprises, financial problems in the 
banking sector re-emerge. Likewise, if bankruptcy proceedings are not effective, banks cannot 
both provide credits and impose financial discipline. For example, cases of rapid banking sector 
liberalisation without these microeconomic conditions in place were often followed by severe 
systemic crisis (OECD, 2000).  
More generally, positive structural interactions do not necessarily follow policy implementation. 
The problem is not only to solve the question of stocks, such as bad debts, but also to ensure that 
the flows, namely exit and entry of firms, new financing and investment, are adequately 
balanced. When the flow problems have not been solved, the stock problems tend to re-emerge, 
with the risk that their resolution becomes even more costly. Where exit mechanisms are 
enforced and induce enterprise liquidations but where the conditions for entry of new 
enterprises are not in place, the pace of restructuring may become politically unsustainable as 
unemployment rises and the economy fail to recover rapidly. 
Another example of the macro-structural complementarity is when an exchange rate anchors 
designed to trigger a disinflation process induce a massive increase in the relative prices of the 
non-tradable sector. When appropriate competition or regulatory policies are not implemented, 
this shock in relative prices together with low price elasticity generates large rents and 
constitutes a drag on the potential growth in the economy.  This effect can be exacerbated when 
policies or incentives towards human capital investment do not exist because the traditional 
tradable sector also tends to loose international price competitiveness.  
Along these lines, Table 4.1 summarises the main policy interdependences just discussed and 
provides examples of the policy feedbacks by main policy blocks, in the sense that implementing 
a reform block increases the return of implementing another one. This provides a first snapshot 
of the potential complementarities existing across reforms. These linkages are at the centre of the 
transition process. Several OECD studies in this area concluded that it was more important to 
ensure that these links operated adequately rather than pushing reform in any single area, 
including institutional development (OECD, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002). One important implication 
of what amounts to an implicit preference for “radial” strategies or, in a looser way, to the 
existence of policy complementarities is that reform reversals can magnify the costs of transition 
(reduce the benefits of reform) perhaps threatening progress in the most advanced policy areas. 
[Table 4.1 Matrix of positive linkages during transition] 
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4.1. The EBRD Transition indicators 
The empirical basis for the observation of the reform process in transition countries was taken 
from the EBRD Transition Report, which provides indicators available for 27 transition countries 
since 1989. The countries are listed in Annex 1, together with the coverage of the three groupings 
considered, reflecting initial conditions but also expected terminal conditions in what pertains to 
EU membership, where European countries are distinguished from the New Independent States 
(NIS) of the former Soviet Union.  
The indicators cover eight main structural reform areas listed in Table 4.2, plus an indicator of 
physical infrastructure development which proxies the attractiveness of the economy to domestic 
and foreign investors. The EBRD indicators are ranked from 1 (no-reform) to 4+ (full reform). For 
completeness, macroeconomic stabilisation is proxied by one additional indicator, the rate of 
consumer price inflation (labelled CPI).2  
[Table 4.2 EBRD Reform Indicators] 
5. Composite Reform Indicators and Complementarity 
Having a set of reform indicators, the question is whether reform momentum is concentrated in 
some reform areas or more evenly distributed.3 A transition process that would aim at 
minimising the welfare losses associated with a piecemeal reform in a second-best context would 
tend to minimise the gap between the different reform areas, while increasing the average level 
of reforms. To evaluate it we need to measure policy complementarity.  The basic idea is that one 
needs to find a metric that verifies the property of complementarity. For example, let us assume 
three reform areas valued in the range [1, 4] as the EBRD indicators.  Then, a move from (1,1,1) to 
(2,2,2) should be better than a move to (4,1,1), although in terms of the average reform level there 
is no difference.  
A reform strategy exploiting policy synergies should then be reflected into an even distribution 
of individual reform indicators. A simple way to capture this is to measure the concentration of 
reforms by means of the usual Hirschmann-Herfindhal indicator and take the reciprocal of it, as 
an index of reform complementarity (RC): 
∑  ⋅
=
i
i
NRL
R
RC 2
1  (4) 
                                                     
2 Other proxies were considered (e.g. budget deficits, current account balances, etc.), but the CPI turned 
out to perform rather well in the econometric tests.  
3 In a previous version of this paper, there is a more detailed description of the transition process and 
composite reform indicators.  This version can be downloaded from the LACEA Annual 
Conference 2005 website at lacea.org.  
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where RL is the simple average4  year by year of the nine sectoral indicators and N for the 
number of reform areas. There is an interesting relationship between the level and the 
complementarity of reforms. In order to draw this relation, it can be shown that the range of 
variation for the two indicators is as follows: 
[ ]
( ) 


⋅−+
−+
∈
∈
N
RNR
RNRRC
RRRL
,
)1(
)1(
,
2
min
2
max
2
minmax
maxmin
 (5) 
where Rmin and Rmax stand for, respectively, the minimum and the maximum reform score (in this 
case 1 and 4+).  
To illustrate the links between these two indicators we can construct a hypothetical case where 
the reform process starts only in one or two reform areas and then, progressively, is extended to 
all reform areas up to the point where all reform indicators reach the maximum reform score. 
This point can be viewed as the end of a policy cycle. This produces a U-shaped relationship 
between RL and RC, the average level of reforms and the complementarity index, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1.  
[Figure 5.1 Reform Level and Complementarity: a hypothetical case] 
It is interesting to note that the d-equilibria, discussed in section 2, are all iso-complementarity loci 
with the RC indicator at its maximum. In some sense, a radial reform strategy could be described 
in terms of the complementarity indicator by a process removing distortions in such a way that 
RC never decreases throughout the transition process.   
Turning now to our actual sample, Figure 5.1 shows that the reform process was indeed 
characterised by a significant decrease of complementarity at the beginning of transition. This 
can be interpreted as follows. Transition is about shifting from a socialist system that had a high 
complementarity, but was totally rigid and distorted, towards a flexible market system that also 
displays a high complementarity. To make this structural change not all distortions could be 
removed at the same time so complementarity decreased.  
[Figure 5.2 Reform complementarity (RC) during transition] 
Interestingly, the most successful transition countries were able to resume the complementarity 
of reforms during the transition process, whereas the lagging or slow-reformers were not able to 
implement the reform process in the same way. Therefore, as it could be expected, reform 
complementarity has increased in the more advanced transition countries that integrated 
recently the EU. 
                                                     
4 Depending on some form of evaluation of the relative importance of policy areas, this indicator could be 
computed using a particular weighting scheme.  Of course, this would not change the main 
thrust of the results.  
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As an aside, there are some insights to be drawn in terms of the comparison between the reform 
process in China and in the former Central and Eastern European countries. The fact that the 
Chinese transition has avoided the large output loss observed in latter group of countries could 
be related to the fact its reform process approach was able to decrease market distortions without 
overly decreasing the overall complementarity of the economic cum institutional system, but this 
testing hypothesis is left for future research.  
6. Reform level, complementarity and growth: an empirical test 
The indicators presented in the previous section, RL and RC, are now related to the growth rate 
of real output. The fact that the ignition of reforms is reflected in a decrease of complementarity 
is equivalent to say that not all distortions could be removed at the same time. As discussed in 
the introduction, this is typically a second-best situation, which can entail a loss of welfare (or 
output, as a proxy). This transitional cost could be reflected in income losses at the beginning of 
the transition. This theoretical intuition is verified in our sample for the New EU Members, as the 
relationship between the average level of reforms and GDP growth shows an initial decline 
followed by an increase until the end of the policy cycle. No such a pattern appears for the Non-
EU group where growth displays a much more erratic relation with the level of reforms. 
Our empirical test takes as a starting point the Falcetti et al. (2002, 2005)’s investigation on the 
relative importance of three sets of factors – initial conditions, macroeconomic stabilisation and 
structural reforms – as determinants of growth in transition economies. They argued that the 
usual debate on the role of initial conditions is much driven by the way the econometric test is 
conducted. A simple cross-section analysis tends to give a much greater weight to initial 
conditions. This is due to the fact that commitment to reform accelerates convergence. This effect 
can be better captured by a panel regression, where the role of reforms emerges strongly. Their 
main result is that “…countries that ‘defied the odds’ by reforming more rapidly and extensively 
than predicted by a simple non-linear time trend, have reaped substantial growth dividends and 
this time the effect is highly significant.”  
In their final remarks, they also point out that the literature on reforms and performance has so 
far largely failed to address the question of “the complementarities between further liberalization 
and privatisation and deeper institutional reform, which have recently received so much 
emphasis in the policy debate… Responding effectively to the challenges of the next decade will 
require more than the recipes of the past.” By integrating both level and complementarity of 
reforms, this paper aims at closing this gap. Indeed, if transition countries –mainly those 
integrating the EU– were able to trigger a reform process and overcome the costs of the initial 
economic recession, our theoretical analysis (section 2) suggests that sustaining growth requires a 
broader reform strategy. 
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We first followed the specification of Falcetti et al. (2002), i.e. the growth rate of GDP is related to 
the level of the reform indicators.5  While this specification is followed in many growth regression 
studies, our framework suggests rather that the variation of distortions (or the reform indicators) 
should be related to output variations.   
Accordingly, we tested a specification where both the levels and variations of the reform 
indicators are included among the regressors (Table 6.1). In order to test for the robustness of the 
results the estimates were carried out through different estimators: first using the usual fixed-
effect estimator, not allowing incorporating the time invariant variable related to the initial 
conditions. Then the initial conditions were added in the context of a GLS random-effects model. 
Finally, a dynamic GMM model (cf. Arellano and Bover, 1998)6 was estimated in order to correct 
for possible endogeneity bias between growth, inflation and the level of reforms.  This addresses 
Rodrik (2005)’s critique of the endogeneity of policy indicators in growth regressions. 
[Table 6.1 Growth, Reform level and Complementarity: an econometric test] 
The results confirm that the countries having a higher reform level (RL) tend to have higher GDP 
growth, but the variation of RL displays a negative sign. Thus, an increment of reforms usually 
induces a negative impact on growth, which is typically the second-best result. Over the long-
run, when reform becomes more broad-based higher levels of reforms are related to higher 
growth rates. The complementarity indicator displays a symmetric pattern, as its level displays a 
negative sign while its variation has the expected positive sign. Indeed, a high complementarity 
by itself does not necessarily lead to higher output growth, because in our sample, unreformed 
countries may have had for some period higher complementarity than reforming ones. To sum-
up, only the level of reforms and the changes in their complementary have a positive impact on 
growth. The former effect provides a long-run target for reforms, while the latter provides 
guidance on the conduct of the transition process.   
                                                     
5 This test was carried out through a panel regression (27 countries by 16 years) including initial 
conditions, a measure of stabilisation and the level of reforms, but with different proxies for the 
initial conditions and macroeconomic stabilisation. In addition, we included the 
complementarity index defined above. For the New European members, the results provide 
relatively robust evidence that the reform indicators play a more important role than the initial 
conditions. This could be expected, as the catch-up process in this group lessens the role of the 
starting conditions. In this sub-sample, both the level and the complementarity of reforms 
display positive and significant coefficients. In the European non-EU members, the impact of 
pre-transition GDP level is negative, no doubt a consequence of the conflict in the Balkans and 
the effect of complementarity does not appear significant. The same applies for the NIS group. 
This is not surprising, as the growth performance in the latter groups is more noisy and volatile 
and there were a number of policy reversals.  An additional regression where the time sample 
was restricted to the initial stages of transition (say, from 1989 to 1995) for all countries would 
show that the reform indicator appears not significant, while the complementary index appears 
positive and significant. The results are available in the paper quoted in footnote 3. 
6 For this we used the xtabond2 command of STATA developed by Roodman (2005).  
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7. Conclusions and further research 
Liberal economic reforms are seen as reducing distortions, thereby raising profitability in the 
more productive sectors of the national economy. If there are many such distortions, then 
eliminating only few of them may be perverse for national welfare, threatening the sustainability 
of the reform process. The complexity of the relationship between reforms and growth is thus 
one reason why it has been so difficult to capture it empirically. Here, we introduce the concept 
of reform complementarity, in addition to the level of reforms, and use them to explain the 
relationship between reforms and growth in transition countries.  
The paper attempted to reconcile the usual presumption that a liberal reform package has to be 
comprehensive by nature with the fact that igniting growth may sometimes require focusing on 
the main distortions blocking the take-off of the economy (see Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco, 
2005). Relating the level with the complementarity of reforms provided a basis for regressing 
them on output growth.  A set of structural reform indicators compiled by the EBRD for Central 
and Eastern European countries in transition was used, assuming that the run-up to EU 
integration corresponds to a nearly complete policy cycle. We found the reform level and the 
change in reform complementarity to be positively related to output growth, given initial 
conditions and the extent of macroeconomic stabilization as proxied by the rate of inflation, 
correcting for possible endogeneity bias between these variables.   
The insights gained from this study of the management of the transition process could be applied 
into the broader context of the EU integration process and reform. The EU countries are facing 
the challenge of globalisation. This shock is putting pressure for reform on what could have been 
viewed as the relatively coherent system, combining rigid labour markets, highly regulated 
product markets, together with some degree of financial centralization (Amable, 2003). 
Currently, the EU economy is diverging from the more dynamic economic areas, in particular the 
US and Asia. Resuming this gap seems to require a degree of flexibility higher than the one 
currently embodied in the so-called ‘European model’, but the question is how to conduct such a 
reform process in such a way that maximises output gains (or minimises possible output losses). 
In this paper we have argued that using policy complementarities could be part of the answer. 
The complementarity index presented here could be refined to take into account more complex 
outcomes than the annual rate of growth, on the hand, and several levels of decision making on 
the other. In effect, complementarity at the national level will certainly not suffice when it comes 
to common policies. Even in what pertains to national policies, the interaction between levels of 
government must be taken into account. We believe though that complementarity will remain a 
useful concept in understand economic growth and development. 
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Appendix: Complementarity, Supermodularity and Optimisation 
Edgeworth was the first propose the idea of complementarity. Factors are Edgeworth 
complements if having more of one factor increases the return on the other factor. Assuming 
mixed partial derivatives of the objective function exist, the sign of the mixed partial derivative 
would be positive. However, in most economic applications smooth mixed partials are restrictive 
-hence the interest in developing a system where this is unnecessary. Lattice theory is a branch of 
mathematics that provides a formal foundation for complementarity and supermodularity.  
A lattice ( ≥;X ) is a set X with the property that for any x and y in X, there exist an element in X 
larger than or equal to x and y, and there exist an element smaller than or equal to x and y.  
yx ∨  denotes the smallest element larger than or equal to x and y (join operation)  
yx ∧   denotes the largest element smaller than or equal to x and y (meet operation) 
 A sublattice is a subset of a lattice that is closed under the operations of meet and join. For 
example, the real numbers is a lattice and any subset of the real numbers is also a lattice. A 
sublattice mathematically expresses a kind of technical complementarity. If a solution x is chosen 
from a sublattice of nℜ (representing n inputs for example), then it means that increasing the 
value of some variable never prevents increasing the others as well. Thus complementarity is 
only really relevant if the space we are considering is a lattice.  
In this context, supermodularity can be defined as: given an objective function f on a lattice X, f is 
supermodular and its arguments are complements if and only if for any x and y in X: 
 )()()()( yfyxfyxfxf −∨≤∧−  (A1) 
In two dimensions we can replace the meet and join operators by explicitly writing out each 
coordinate, as given in the section 3 in the text.  
Supermodularity and optimization 
Supermodularity also has interesting applications for optimizing an objective function. If x and y 
maximize a supermodular f on a sublattice S, then yx ∨ and yx ∧  also maximize f.  
Quick proof: Since f(x) = f(y), then from supermodularity: )()()(2 yxfyxfxf ∧+∨≤⋅ . But since 
x maximizes f: )()( yxfxf ∨≥  and )()( yxfxf ∧≥ . Thus, )()()( yxfyxfxf ∧=∨= . This 
means that the maximizers of f have an interesting pattern: 
1) Either they are strictly ordered (component by component)  
2) For any unordered pair of maximizers, there must be maximizers strictly greater or less than 
either of these two maximizers. 
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Supermodularity also enables the decision maker to more easily check if x maximizes an 
objective function f, because one can restrict the search only to those points greater or less than x. 
This reduces the search space dramatically from n2 orthants to just 2. If this restricted search 
space does not contain a point x’ such that )()( xfxf ≥′ , then there are no points in the entire 
lattice S that gives a higher payoff.  
It is interesting to also note that simply optimizing over this restricted domain will give at least 
50% of the potential gains in an unrestricted optimization. The proof is relatively simple: 
Since Equation A1 is true for all x and y. The following is also true: 
 )()()()( xfyxfyxfyf −∨≤∧−  (A2) 
We can change the sign of Equation A2: 
 )()()()( xfyxfyxfyf −∧≤∨−  (A3) 
Combining the previous two equations, and simplifying we get: 
 [ ] [ ] )()()()()()( xfyfxfyxfxfyxf −≥−∨+−∧  (A4) 
Assume that y is the global optimum of f. Let x’ be the maximum of f subject to xx ≤′  or xx ≥′ . 
Since xyx ≤∧ )(  and xyx ≤∨ )( , it follows that: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] )()()()()()()()(2 xfyfxfyxfxfyxfxfxf −≥−∨+−∧≥−′⋅  (A5) 
This implies that: 
 [ ] 2/)()()()( xfyfxfxf −≥−′  (A6) 
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Data Annex: Country list and groupings 
The list of the countries covered in the EBRD database and the regional groupings used in the 
text are as follows: 
 
 Country code/name Regional Grouping 
 
1 Albania  NEU 
2 Armenia  NIS 
3 Azerbaijan  NIS 
4 Belarus  NIS 
5 Bosnia  NEU 
6 Bulgaria  NEU  
7 Croatia  NEU 
8 Czech Republic  NWEU 
9 Estonia  NWEU 
10 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  NEU 
11 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  NEU 
12 Georgia  NIS 
13 Hungary  NWEU 
14 Kazakhstan  NIS 
15 Kyrgyzstan  NIS 
16 Latvia  NWEU 
17 Lithuania  NWEU 
18 Moldova  NIS 
19 Poland  NWEU 
20 Romania  NEU 
21 Russia  NIS 
22 Slovak Republic  NWEU 
23 Slovenia  NWEU 
24 Tajikistan  NIS 
25 Turkmenistan  NIS 
26 Ukraine  NIS 
27 Uzbekistan  NIS 
  17
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D. (2005), “Equilibrium Bias of Techonology”, MIT Economics Department Working 
Paper no. 05-30. 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2005), "Appropriate Growth Policy: A Unifying Framework", Paper 
presented at the OECD Conference on Global convergence scenarios: structural and policy 
issues, Paris, January 2006.  
Amable, B. (2003), The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amir, R. (2003), “Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics: an Elementary Survey”, 
CORE.   
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1998), “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 29-52. 
Bergstrom, T. (1996), “Comment on The Welfare Loss of Price Distortion”, mimeo, Department of 
Economics UCSB.  
Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2002), "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in 
Goods and Labor Markets“, MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 01-02.  
EBRD, Transition Report (several issues). 
Falcetti E., M. Raiser and P. Sanfey (2002), "Defying the odds: initial conditions, reforms and 
growth in the first decade of transition", EBRD Working paper no. 55 
Falcetti E., M. Raiser and P. Sanfey (2005), " Reforms and growth in transition: re-examining the 
evidence", EBRD Working paper no. 90 
Foster, E. and H. Sonnenschein (1970), “Price Distortion and Economic Welfare”, Econometrica, 
38, 281-297. 
Hausmann, R., D. Rodrik and A. Velasco (2005), “Growth Diagnostics”, mimeo, Harvard 
University. 
Kawamata, K. (1974), “Price Distortion and Potential Welfare”, Econometrica, 42, 435-460. 
 18
Lipsey, R.G. and K. Lancaster (1956), “The General Theory of Second Best”, The Review of 
Economic Studies, 24, 11-32.  
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990), “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, 
Strategy, and Organisation”, The American Economic Review, 80, 511-528.  
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1995), “Complementarities and Fit Strategy, Structure, and 
Organisation Change in Manufacturing”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, 179-208. 
Nardo, M., M. Saisana, A. Saltelli, S. Tarentola, A. Hoffman and E. Giovaninni (2005), Handbook 
on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide, OECD Statistics Working 
Paper 2005(3).   
OECD (1998), Economic Survey of Romania, Paris. 
OECD (1999), Economic Survey of Slovak Republic, Paris. 
OECD (2000), Regional Economic Survey of the Baltic countries, Paris. 
OECD (2002), Economic Survey of Romania, Paris.  
Rader, T. (1976), “The Welfare Losses of Price Distortion”, Econometrica, vol. 44, no. 6, 1253-1257. 
Roodman, D (2005), "xtabond2: Stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator", 
Center for Global Development, Washington, 
downloadable at: http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s435901.htm 
Rodrik, D. (2003), “Growth Strategies”, forthcoming in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook 
of Economic Growth, North-Holland. 
Rodrik, D. (2005), “Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies”, 
mimeo, Harvard University. 
Rodrik, D. (2006), “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?”, mimeo, 
Harvard University. 
Topkis, D.M. (1987), "Minimising a Submodular Function on a Lattice", Operations Research, 26(2), 
pp. 305-321. 
Topkis, D.M. (1998), Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  
19
Fi
gu
re
 5
.1
 R
ef
or
m
 le
ve
ls
 a
nd
 C
om
pl
em
en
ta
ri
ty
: a
 h
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 c
as
e 
 
Pr
e-
re
fo
rm
Ig
ni
tin
g 
Re
fo
rm
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
1
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
2
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
3
En
d 
Re
fo
rm
PL
1.
0
4.
0
4.
0
4.
0
4.
0
4.
0
TF
ES
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
3.
0
4.
0
4.
0
SM
NB
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
4.
0
BR
&I
RL
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
4.
0
LS
P
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
4.
0
SS
P
1.
0
1.
0
4.
0
4.
0
4.
0
4.
0
G
&E
R
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
4.
0
CP
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
4.
0
IN
FR
AS
T
1.
0
1.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
4.
0
5.
00
5.
50
6.
00
6.
50
7.
00
7.
50
8.
00
8.
50
9.
00
9.
50
1.
00
1.
50
2.
00
2.
50
3.
00
3.
50
4.
00
RC
RL
Pr
e-
re
fo
rm
En
d 
Re
fo
rm
 
 
 20
Figure 5.2a Reform Complementarity (RC), New EU Members 
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Figure 5.2b Reform Complementarity (RC), European non-EU Members 
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Figure 5.2c Reform Complementarity (RC), NIS 
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